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Abstract
In existing RBAC literature, administrative privileges are inherited
just like ordinary user privileges. We argue that from a security view-
point this is too restrictive, and we believe that a more flexible approach
can be very useful in practice. We define an ordering on the set of adminis-
trative privileges, enabling us to extend the standard privilege inheritance
relation in a natural way. This means that if a user has a particular ad-
ministrative privilege, then she is also implicitly authorized for weaker
administrative privileges. We prove the non-trivial result that it is possi-
ble to decide whether one administrative privilege is weaker than another
and show how this result can be used to decide administrative requests in
an RBAC security monitor.
1 Introduction
Role-based access control (RBAC) [11] is a non-discretionary access control
mechanism that simplifies the assignment of access rights to users. The basic
idea is that while there are many access rights and users, rights and users can be
grouped using a relatively small number of roles, ordered in a role hierarchy. In
practice however, an RBAC system in a large enterprise may involve thousands
of roles [5]. Keeping the access rights and roles up to date with changes in
the enterprise may be a too big task for a single administrator. The usual
approach to this problem is to divide the work and to allow delegation of part
of the administrator’s authority to other users. It is convenient to make this
delegation mechanism flexible, in order to reduce the likelihood of bottlenecks
and (administrative) users sharing keys or passwords that should remain secret.
On the other hand, the delegation mechanism should be safe: users should not
obtain rights other than those explicitly delegated by the administrator.
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Several lines of research address the problem of delegation of administrative
privileges in RBAC systems; Ferraiolo et al. [5] compare some of the different
approaches. The main issue in these lines of research is how to model adminis-
trative privileges, as opposed to the ordinary user privileges, and to decide who
should have them. In ARBAC [10] administrative privileges are assigned to a
separate hierarchy of administrative roles and defined by specifying a range of
roles that can be changed. Crampton and Loizou [4] take a more general ap-
proach, by using the same hierarchy for both the administrative privileges and
the ordinary user privileges. Using the concept of administrative scope, they
define which roles should have administrative privileges over other roles. In the
Role-Control Center [5], administrative privileges over roles are defined in terms
of views, which are subsets of the role-hierarchy, and they can only be assigned
to users assigned to these roles.
In existing RBAC literature [2, 4, 5, 10, 15], administrative privileges are
inherited just like ordinary user privileges. We argue that this approach is
more restrictive than necessary for safety: consider a simple setting where an
administrator has delegated the authority to some user u to assign a user u′
to a high role in the role-hierarchy. When user u uses this authority, user u′
becomes assigned to the high role, and consequently u′ can also play lower roles.
There is no security motivation for not letting user u assign user u′ directly to
(one of) the lower roles. User u′ could play the lower roles anyway. However,
in standard RBAC, administrative privileges are not interpreted in this way1
In this paper, we define an ordering on the administrative privileges, en-
abling us to extend the standard privilege inheritance relation in a natural way.
This means that if a user has a particular administrative privilege, then she is
also implicitly authorized for weaker administrative privileges. Basically, this
allows for a more flexible use of administrative privileges. Additionally, we show
that the new relation is tractable, and we sketch a possible implementation of
the extended inheritance relation. We argue that decentralized management of
RBAC becomes more flexible with this extension.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we give some definitions about the standard RBAC model [11].
Definition 2.1 (RBAC State) Given the sets U of users, R of roles and P
of privileges, we define an RBAC state as a tuple,
(UA,RH ,PA),
1It could be argued that an entry in, say, an ARBAC97 relation or the existence of a
particular administrative scope, by implication gives additional administrative privileges. This
is not, however, mentioned explicitly.
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where,
UA ⊆ U ×R
RH ⊆ R×R (a directed graph on R)
PA ⊆ R× P.
Here UA determines which users are assigned to which roles in R. The graph RH
is the so-called role-hierarchy and PA determines which privileges are assigned
to which roles. A user can play the roles to which it is assigned, and the roles
that are below them in the hierarchy. Sometimes (r, r′) ∈ RH is written as
r > r′. Below we denote the reflexive transitive closure over the graph RH with
> (also known as the partial order on RH ).
In the RBAC model [11], a user does not get all the privileges associated to
the roles it can play: The user has to start a session, in which one or more of
the user’s roles can be activated. The session gets only all the privileges of the
activated roles. Basically, this allows users to operate from sessions with less
privileges than they are entitled to, implementing the so-called principle of least
privilege. In this paper, for the sake of brevity, we will not be explicit about
sessions nor the activations of roles.
Remark 2.2 (About cycles in the role-graph) In some of the existing lit-
erature on RBAC, it is required that RH be acyclic, to avoid redundancy. For
example, if both (a, b) ∈ RH and (b, a) ∈ RH , then using the two different names
a and b is redundant. Similarly, sometimes RH is required to be transitively
reduced; for example, the transitive reduction of {(a, b), (b, c), (a, c)} removes
the last element, because there would be a path anyway from a to c using the
other edges.
For the sake of brevity, we ignore such constraints. Actually, we do not
assume any set of constraints on RH or PA throughout this paper. The results
in this paper apply equally to acyclic and cyclic directed graphs. Moreover,
the extension of the privilege inheritance relation, to be introduced in the next
section, does not introduce extra cycles (in some cases it removes cycles).
Given an RBAC state, we say that a role r has a privilege p, if (r, p) ∈ PA.
Additionally, it is common (see below) that privileges of lower roles are available
as well, i.e. without the need to activate the lower roles first. This is known as
privilege inheritance. See for example the RBAC state shown in Figure 1a. The
role r1 inherits the privilege p assigned to role r2. With privilege inheritance
the edge from r1 to p in Figure 1b is redundant.
Definition 2.3 (Privilege Inheritance) Given an RBAC state (UA,RH ,PA),
a role r has the privilege p, denoted r Ã p, only if
r > r′ and (r′, p) ∈ PA for some r′ ∈ R.
When a user activates a role in a session, this session acquires all the privileges
of the role.
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Figure 1: Two sample RBAC states. With privilege inheritance the extra edge
on the right is redundant.
The advantage of privilege inheritance in RBAC is that it allows users in a
high role, to also use privileges of a lower role, without activating that lower role.
This is a well-known feature of RBAC, which can be used to avoid repetitive
definitions in the RBAC state (like the edge between r1 and p).
3 A Different View on Administrative Privileges
Privileges can be divided into user privileges and administrative privileges [11].
While user privileges allow actions on objects (such as printing files or viewing
records), administrative privileges, allow actions on the RBAC state itself, e.g.
adding an edge from one role to another. Here we assume that user privileges
form a finite set of atomic privileges, denoted by Q, that corresponds to a finite
set of actions on objects. On the other hand, the set of administrative privileges
is necessarily infinite, because privileges about administrative privileges are in-
cluded as well. We formalize the full set of privileges by defining a grammar
that encompasses both user privileges and administrative privileges.
Definition 3.1 (Privilege Grammar) Given the sets U of users, R of roles
and Q of user privileges, the set of all privileges P is defined by the following
grammar:
p ::= q |addUser(u, r) | addEdge(r, r′) | addPrivilege(r, p),
where u ∈ U , q ∈ Q and r, r′ ∈ R.
Each administrative privilege corresponds to an administrative action. The
privilege addUser(u, r) allows the action of adding a member u to the role r.
The privilege addEdge(r1, r2) allows the action of adding an edge from role r1 to
r2. The construct addPrivilege is a grammatical connective and consequently -
as mentioned above - the set P is infinite despite the fact that the sets of users,
roles and user privileges are all finite. In the existing literature the number of
administrative levels (in other words, the number of nestings of the addPrivilege
connective) is sometimes restricted to one [11] or to two levels [15]. We agree
that administrative privileges with multiple levels of administration might not
be useful in some implementations. However, here we take a general approach,
and we let the administrators choose which administrative privileges to use. We
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should mention also that most existing models constrain the roles that can have
administrative privileges, for example to prevent low roles obtaining privileges
to change membership of higher roles [4]. We do not make choices with respect
to such constraints.
In most existing literature on the administration of RBAC systems some
constraints are assumed that restrict which roles should have administrative
privileges over others. For example, in the original RBAC model, administrative
privileges can only be assigned to a separate set of administrative roles. In
the RCC model [5] a role can only assign a privilege if the role itself has that
privilege. In the RHA model [4] a role only has the privilege to administer other
roles that are in its administrative scope. We do not exclude any of these choices
and we assume that, in principle, any role can be assigned any administrative
privilege. In the sequel, we focus on the inheritance of administrative privileges.
3.1 Extended Privilege Inheritance
An RBAC state is denoted by a triple (UA,RH ,PA), containing the user-role
assignments, the edges between roles and the privilege assignments to roles. A
well-known feature of RBAC is privilege inheritance [11], by which a role has
the privileges to which it is explicitly assigned, and additionally, the privileges
of lower roles.
Definition 3.2 (Standard Privilege Inheritance) Let (UA,RH ,PA) denote
an RBAC state and let > denote the reflexive transitive closure of RH , we say
that a role r has the privilege p, denoted by r Ã p, iff
r > r′ and (r′, p) ∈ PA for some r′ ∈ R.
We argue that the standard privilege inheritance is inadequate for adminis-
trative privileges. Take for example a role r with the privilege to add an edge
e from r2 to r3. The role r does not have the privilege to add an edge from r2
to any role below r3, nor the privilege to add an edge from any role above r2 to
r3. However, from a security point of view this makes no sense, because with
edge e in place there would be anyway a path to roles below r3, or a path from
roles above r2. The standard RBAC privilege inheritance however does not
capture this, and treats administrative privileges like ordinary user privileges.
In Figure 2 we show the six different cases where administrative privileges yield
weaker administrative privileges. For example, in Figure 2a, the (administra-
tive) privilege to assign user u to role r1 (the dashed edge) is stronger than
the privilege to assign user u to role r2. In Figure 2b, the privilege to add an
edge between r1 and r2 (the dashed arrow) is stronger than the privilege to add
only user u to role r2. And so on. We formalize this ordering by the following
definition.
Definition 3.3 (Privilege Ordering) Let (UA,RH ,PA) be an RBAC state,
let p, p1, p2 be privileges in P , let Q be the subset of user privileges in P , and
let r1, r2, r3, r4 be roles in R. We define the relation → as the smallest relation
satisfying:
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Figure 2: The right to add the dashed edge is stronger than the right to add
the dotted edge.
1. p→ p, if p ∈ Q
2. addUser(u, r1)→ addUser(u, r2), if r1 > r2
3. addEdge(r1, r2)→ addUser(u, r3), if r2 > r3 and (u, r1) ∈ UA
4. addEdge(r2, r3)→ addEdge(r1, r4), if r1 > r2 and r3 > r4
5. addEdge(r2, r3)→ addPrivilege(r1, p2), if r1 > r2, r3 > r4, (r4, p1) ∈ PA
and p1 → p2
6. addPrivilege(r2, p1)→ addPrivilege(r1, p2), if r1 > r2 and p1 → p2
The ordering → is both reflexive and transitive.
The ordering of privileges yields an extension of the standard privilege in-
heritance relation.
Definition 3.4 (Extended Privilege Inheritance) Let (UA,RH ,PA) be an
RBAC state, let r be a role in R and p be a role in P , and letÃ denote the stan-
dard privilege inheritance, reported in Definition 3.2. We say that the extended
privilege inheritance r Ã∗ p holds iff
r Ã p′ and p′ → p, for some p′ ∈ P .
The extended privilege inheritance relation is useful because it allows users, with
administrative privileges, to be implicitly authorized for weaker administrative
privileges. Thereby, it gives administrative users the possibility to perform
safer administrative operations than the ones originally allowed. We now give
a practical example of its usage.
Example 3.5 (Visiting Researcher) Charlie, the security administrator, gives
the staff the privilege to add visiting researchers to the staff role. There is also
a role below staff called wifi, with the privilege to use the wireless network. Alice
is a visiting researcher and Bob is a member of the staff. Alice only needs access
to the wifi network, so Bob would like Alice to use the wifi role. Charlie (who
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Figure 3: A practical example of the use of the extended inheritance relation.
just left) did not provide this privilege explicitly to the staff. This scenario is
illustrated in Figure 3.
In the standard RBAC model, Bob can only assign Alice to the staff role.
Given the fact that Alice only needs wifi access, Bob urges Alice to apply the
principle of least privilege, and to activate only the wifi role. However, Bob can
only hope that Alice does so. With the extended privilege inheritance relation
Bob can assign Alice to the wifi role because of his privilege to add users to the
staff role. In a way, instead of preaching the principle of least privilege to Alice,
Bob applies it for her.
3.2 Tractability
Now we address a practical issue. We prove that the extended privilege inher-
itance relation (Definition 3.4) is tractable. Since the full set P of privileges
is infinite, this result is not immediate. For instance, a naive forward search
does not necessarily terminate (see below). The proof also indicates how a de-
cision algorithm, deciding which privileges are to be given to which roles, can
be implemented at an RBAC security monitor.
First notice that since RH and PA are finite sets, the standard privilege
inheritance Ã is decidable. To show how to decide whether r Ã∗ p, we first
prove that there is an algorithm that can decide, whether p→ q, for any p, q in
P .
Lemma 3.6 (Decidability of the Ordering Relation) Given an
RBAC state S, and two privileges p, q, it is decidable whether p→ q.
Proof 1 The proof is by structural induction over q.
The base cases are when q is not of the form addPrivilege(., .). We show
that for the three base cases p→ q is decidable:
• Either q is a user privilege from Q. In this case p → q holds only when
p = q (see rule (1) in Definition 3.4).
• Or q is of the form addUser(., .) in which case only rule (2) needs to be
checked, which has finite premises.
• Or q is of the form addEdge(., .), in which case the rules (2) and (3) of
Definition 3.3 need to be checked. Both have finite premises.
7
For the induction step, suppose that q is addPrivilege(r′, q′), for some role r′
and privilege q′. Now, p→ q can only hold if either p is of the form addEdge(., .)
and the premises of rule (5) holds, or p is of the form addPrivilege(., .) and the
premises of rule (6) holds. In both cases, the premises are decidable, either
because they are finite, or because the induction hypothesis is applicable (in
p′ → q′, q′ is structurally smaller than q, regardless of p′).
Theorem 3.7 (Decidability of Extended Privilege Inheritance)
Given an RBAC state, a role r and a privilege p in P , there is an algorithm to
determine whether r Ã∗ p.
Proof 2 The standard privilege inheritance Ã is decidable, yielding a finite set
of privileges p′ inherited by r. Now for each privilege p′ we need to check whether
p′ → p. This was shown to be decidable in the previous lemma.
We now give an example of how the above described procedure can be used
in practice.
Example 3.8 Consider Example 3.5 again.
Can Bob assign Alice to the wifi role? We have to check that the role staff
inherits the privilege addUser(alice,wifi). Using the first part of Definition 3.4,
one finds that the staff role has the privilege addUser(alice, staff ). Now we
should decide whether
addUser(alice, staff )→ addUser(alice,wifi).
This follows trivially from the first rule of Definition 3.3.
To give a more involved example, suppose that the system administrator
Charlie has the privilege addPrivilege(staff , addUser(alice, staff )). Can Charlie
also give the staff role the privilege addUser(alice,wifi)? We have to check
whether
addPrivilege(staff , addUser(alice, staff ))→
addPrivilege(staff , addUser(alice,wifi)).
This is indeed the case by using rule (6) first, and then rule (2).
Now, for the sake of exposition, let us remove the edge between the staff
and the wifi role. Let us show how to determine that the previous relation
does not hold: Only rule (6) applies, in which case we must decide whether
addUser(alice, staff )→ addUser(alice,wifi). This is a base case of the induction
described in the proof of Lemma 3.6: Only rule (2) remains to be checked and
than we can conclude that it does not hold.
It could be useful to find all the privileges p′ weaker than a given p. However,
in some cases the set of all privileges p′ weaker than a given privilege p, is infinite.
For the interested reader, we give an example of this in the appendix.
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4 Related Work
The problem of administration of an RBAC system was first addressed by
Sandhu et al. [11]. Later, numerous articles have been published extending or
improving the administration model proposed there [2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 13, 14, 15].
We discuss some of them.
Barka et al. [2] distinguish between original and delegated user role assign-
ments. Delegations are modeled using special sets, and different sets are used
for single step and double step delegations (which must remain disjoint). A
function is used to verify if membership to a role can be delegated. Privileges
can also be delegated, provided they are in the special set of delegatable privi-
leges belonging to the role. In their work, each level of delegation requires the
definition of tens of sets and functions, whereas in our model administrative
privileges, of an arbitrary complexity, are simply assigned to roles, just like the
ordinary privileges. The PDBM model [15] defines a cascaded delegation. This
form of delegation is also expressible in our grammar. In the PDBM model,
however, each delegation requires the addition of a separate role, whereas, in
our model the privileges for delegations are assigned to roles just as the ordinary
privileges. It is not required to add any additional roles.
A number of proposals define general constraints on the administrative priv-
ileges. For example, the constraint that a user must first have a privilege, before
being allowed to delegate it to other users. Note that, as mentioned earlier, in
this paper no particular choice is made with respect to such constraints. Zhang
et al. [14] implement rule based constraints on delegations. They demonstrate
their model using a Prolog program. Basically, they analyze the properties of
a centralized RBAC system, focussing on so-called separation of duty policies.
Crampton [4] defines the concept of administrative scope. Basically a role r is
in the scope of a role r′ if there is no role above r′ that is not below r. They
show how administrative scope can be used to constrain delegations to evolve in
a natural progression in the role hierarchy. Bandman et al. [1] use a general con-
straint language to specify constraints on who can receive certain delegations. A
more complex issue (another type of constraint) is the transfer of delegations [3].
Here the delegator looses the right it is delegating. Such delegations may be
useful in practice, and we are interested to see how they can be implemented in
our model.
Role-based trust management systems [6, 7, 8, 12] and distributed certifi-
cate systems, such as SDSI [9], are related lines of research. In these systems, a
number of agents exchange security statements. Specifically, agents may make
hierarchies similar to those in RBAC, simply by uttering certain security state-
ments. In such models it is often assumed that users are free to utter security
statements, while the focus is on wether to trust such statements (typically
by some trust calculation by the receiver). In the RBAC setting however this
assumption is very inappropriate. Statements changing the RBAC hierarchy
should not be uttered by users, unless they have the explicit privilege to do so.
Despite this difference, our result does apply also to role-based trust manage-
ment models. The extended privilege inheritance relation would then correspond
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to the notion of refinement of policies or trust statements.
5 Conclusion
With this work we make a contribution to the design of flexible administration
models for RBAC. Flexible administration is important to cut the cost of main-
tenance and to enable the RBAC system to adapt to changing circumstances.
Concretely, our contribution is an extension of the standard RBAC privilege
inheritance relation. We defined an ordering on administrative privileges, that
enabled us to extend the standard privilege inheritance relation in the natural
way. This means that if a user has a particular administrative privilege, then
she is also implicitly authorized for weaker administrative privileges. We showed
that this relation is tractable. Our extension can be seen as an application of
the principle of least privilege at the level of administration.
Flexibility of management is an important requisite when deploying access
control systems in practice. For example, discretionary access control systems
are widely used because they are so flexible. RBAC on the other hand is less
flexible, but it can be used to implement also mandatory security policy (for
instance like in the Bell LaPadula model). To allow for a more flexible man-
agement, we extend the standard RBAC privilege inheritance. Basically, users
with administrative privileges can also use lesser administrative privileges. Our
extension can be seen as an application of the principle of least privilege to
administration.
Of course, the definitions of the RBAC state can be chosen such that the
extended and the standard inheritance relation yield the same result. In most
cases however this is cumbersome. For example, the dotted edge in Figure 3
could also be explicitly added as an administrative privilege for the staff role.
However, when the edge between the staff role and the wifi role is removed,
then this makes no sense anymore. This kind of dependencies may complicate
changing the role-hierarchy. Such repetitive definitions are not needed, when
using the extended privilege inheritance.
Finally, a number of improvements and additions can be made. We do not
express privileges such as ∀r.addEdge(r′, r)), which may be useful in practice,
but we believe that special care is needed to deal with quantifiers. Finally, as
we do not make a particular choice regarding constraints on the administrative
privileges, it would be interesting to investigate how our results can be combined
with, for example, the work by Crampton and Loizou [4] or that of Bandmann
et al. [1].
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A Infinitely many weaker privileges
Consider a state where (r2, addEdge(r1, r2)) ∈ PA. Suppose now we are inter-
ested in finding all the privileges weaker than addEdge(r1, r2). The first weaker
privilege we discover by applying rule (5) in definition 3.3:
addPrivilege(r1, addEdge(r1, r2)).
Using this result in rule (6), we find another weaker privilege,
addPrivilege(r1, addPrivilege(r1, addEdge(r1, r2))),
and we can use this again in rule (6), and so on.
Note that the outer nesting in the last term is in a sense redundant. Instead
of assigning the privilege addEdge(r1, r2) to r1, one assigns the privilege to do so,
to r1. This only requires the users in role r1 to perform another administrative
step: The extra nesting is useless. It seems that we can stop after n applications
of rule (6), where n is the length of the longest chain in RH , but we do not
make this observation more formal here.
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